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1. Introduction 
 
Describing his image of youngsters working in the fishing industry in Maine at the 
turn of the century, the photographer Lewis Hines wrote: 
 
Fish cutters at a Canning Co in Maine. Ages range from 7 to 12. They live 
near the factory. The 7-year-old boy in front, Byron Hamilton, has a badly 
cut finger but helps his brother regularly. Behind him is his brother 
George, age 11, who cut his finger half off while working. Ralph, on the 
left, displays his knife and also a badly cut finger. They and many 
youngsters said they were always cutting themselves. George earns a 
dollar some days usually 75 cents. Some of the others say they earn a $1 
when they work all day. At times they start at 7 a.m. and work all day until 
midnight. 
 
Contrast this with a different picture of youth in 2001, in a New York Times op-ed 
piece about the barriers to employing youth in the United States: 
 
Good economic times were not enough to lift dropouts out of the 
unemployment trough . . .[Y]oung adults with limited formal schooling . . 
.faced substantial barriers to employment even in a national full 
employment labor market environment . . . 
 
The worse news is that the population of 16-to 24-year-olds in the US is 
expected to grow at an above average rate for the next decade.  Much of 
the increase will come from the very groups that at the moment are 
struggling in terms of education and employment, especially blacks, 
Hispanics and young immigrants. 
 
For both quotes some context is useful.  Hines’ picture and description came at 
the end of a period when some 35 states already had (though not with much 
federal support) put laws into place limiting the excesses of child labor.  The 
concern about the risks of unregulated workplaces was already diminishing, a 
result of legislation and the widening requirement for universal, publicly 
supported education. 
 
The second quote too comes toward the end of a phase—but a very different 
one.  As Bob Herbert notes, we have moved past the peak of a historical era of 
national full employment—one that especially favored young people.  Yet, he 
argues, the rising tide has failed to raise the prospects for a core segment of the 
youth population.  And their numbers are about to swell with a rising new cadre 
of young people, many of them poor, poorly educated, minority and immigrant. 
 
With the experience of a century that has witnessed sweeping changes in the 
workplace, no sensible person would countenance a return to the exploitive 
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sweatshop settings of the 19th century.  And reflexively, most would agree with 
Mr. Herbert that the nation can ill afford to stand by while hundreds of thousands 
of young people are shut out of jobs and useful futures. 
 
He strikes a chord because work is a defining personal characteristic, a way for 
everyone to achieve a legitimate place in society.  In the U.S., this notion is 
colored by an implicit belief that, with individual dedication, effort and hard work 
anyone can transcend her or his background and limitations, and reach Horatio 
Alger-levels of success. 
 
Increasingly, though, the U.S. economy demands of its workers skills, knowledge 
and education.  Education and a continuing capacity to learn are no longer 
merely important—they are essential.  To enter the workplace without requisite 
skills and learning, and lose time in extended joblessness, is no longer a 
handicap, but rather a virtual disbarment from participating in the labor force and 
the larger society. Unemployed and under-educated youth thus face serious 
long-term risks and the prospect of considerable hardship. 
 
While that prompts an emotional response, there is also a core policy issue in 
this concern. Unproductive young people also burden society.  They must be 
supported financially (by families or public sources), their children frequently 
must also be provided for, and disproportionately these youth will be involved in 
substance abuse and crime, adding to the social and institutional expenses the 
rest of us must defray through our taxes.1 
 
These are legitimate and clear-cut causes for unease.  However, determining the 
extent of the underlying issues that gives rise to them, and deciding on the best 
ways to turn those concerns into policies and actions, are complex issues, which 
we propose to explore in this paper.  Three questions are prominent: 
 
1. How do we define the youth employment problem? 
 
2. What have been the history and success of policy efforts to respond to it? 
 
3. What do history and experience suggest as the most appropriate and 
feasible policies to pursue? 
 
and these are discussed in the following sections. 
 
2. Defining the issue:  three perspectives 
 
“Youth,” in the context of policy discussion, has often been used as an imprecise 
and elastic term of art.  While this has decided benefits for rhetoric and advocacy 
(We routinely proclaim youth as “the future of our nation” and decry the plight of 
jobless “youth”), it leads to messiness from a policy perspective.  In the context of 
employment policy, “youth” has been a varying set of demographic categories: 
 Taking Stock  Page 3 
14-15 year-olds (who will be little discussed in this paper); 16-19 year olds; 18-24 
year olds; “older” youth and “younger” youth; or “in-school” and “out-of-school” 
youth 2  
 
No attempt will be made here to settle definitional questions. In the presentation 
that follows, the categories and groupings will reflect available source data from 
the Bureau of Labor Statistics and from the U.S. Department of Education. For 
the most part the discussion focuses on youth between the ages of 16-24, with 
October 2000 used as a reference point. It was chosen because 2000 marked a 
relative high-water mark in economic activity (and thus labor market opportunity), 
and also because it was possible to incorporate data from a comprehensive 
study of school leaving issued by the Education Department. 
 
1. Basic Demographics.  In October 2000 approximately 140 million 
Americans (out of a civilian population, 16 and older, of roughly 210 million), 
were classified as being in the workforce3.  Of those workers, roughly 20 million 
were aged 16-24, out of a total population of roughly 35 million.  Nearly half of 
the 20 million was enrolled in school (many of them worked as well as attended). 
 
TABLE 1: Basic Labor Force Demographics, October 2000 
 
Number of workers (000s) 
Population, 16 and older  210,378
Civilian Labor Force 140,893
Number Employed 135,771
Employed, 20 and older 128,799
Population, 16-24 34,530
Employed, 16-24 20,566
Employed, 16-19 6,972
Employed, 20-24 13,541
 
Unemployment Rates (%) 
Total, 16 and older 3.6
20 and older 3.1
16-24 8.4
16-19 12.4
20-24 6.3
Source: Bureau of Labor Statistics, The Employment 
Situation and Employment and Earnings 
 
NOTE: Since two different data sources were used to 
compile this table, the rates may reflect slight disparities 
in underlying counts. 
 
A total of about 4 million of the 35 million or so young people were (as will be 
detailed below) neither working nor in school.  At the same time, though, some 
18 million of them were working (a number that normally swells by more than 2 
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million during the summer); about 1.9 million were unemployed and seeking 
work. 
 
Over the next two decades, following a short-lived decline in share, young people 
are expected again to increase as a proportion of the overall population, and 
hence also of the labor force.  The increase, census projections suggest, will be 
modest in overall scale. However, dramatic change expected is in the ethnic 
composition of the population.  The growth rate of the Hispanic population, fueled 
both by in-migration and high birth rates, is expected to continue.  Somewhere 
between 2010 and 2020, the Hispanic youth cohort, is expected to grow larger 
than the corresponding Black cohort. 
 
It seems clear that changes in the political landscape will result from this 
demographic shift.  In particular, in such states as California and Texas, where 
in-migration will continue to be intense, changes in demographic patterns will be 
sharply evident.  For youth and the labor force, the growing fraction of youth who 
may be English-language-deficient is certain to add to the challenges already 
faced by public education systems, in those states and elsewhere. 
 
2. Labor Force Attachment and Inactivity Table 2, showing data for 
October 2001, presents a pattern that, with modest cyclical variation, has been 
seen over much of the last three decades. 
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Table 2 Unemployment Rates, Selected Age and Racial Categories, October 
2000 
 
  
Age  
Unemployment 
Rate (%) 
16 and older 3.6 
16-24 8.4 
16-19 12.4 
 
 
Total 
20-24 6.3 
 
16 and older 3.1 
16-24 7.2 
16-19 10.8 
 
 
White 
20-24 5.2 
 
16 and older 7.0 
16-24 16.5 
16-19 23.7 
 
 
Black 
20-24 13.1 
 
16 and older 4.9 
16-24 8.2 
16-19 12.5 
 
 
Hispanic 
20-24 6.2 
Source:  Bureau of Labor Statistics, Employment Situation and 
Employment and Earnings 
 
Note:  Since two different data sources were used to compile this 
table, the rates may reflect slight disparities in underlying counts. 
  
 
Several basic patterns should be stressed.  The most salient is that 
unemployment rates routinely are higher for young people than for the adult 
population in general.  The reasons for this are straightforward.  Young people 
have less need to work than adults, are more likely to be working temporarily, 
informally, or part-time (particularly those in school), and are more likely to be 
moving through a variety of jobs; hence their attachment to the labor market is 
more volatile. 
 
In addition, for young people—particularly those in the 16-19 year old segment—
entry into the labor market has an experimental flavor.  They may (in some cases 
willingly, in others not) try out a variety of jobs until they find themselves attracted 
to a particular occupation or setting.  Add to this the fact that young people, even 
those past high-school age, are far less likely to have stringent fiscal 
obligations—most still are not parents, and may be living with family—and 
 Taking Stock  Page 6 
therefore have the latitude to leave jobs that they find uninteresting, seek others, 
or remain unemployed. 
 
The figures in the table bear this out.  Consistently—across ethnic groups—16-
19 year olds have higher unemployment rates.  The older segment, 20 to 24, 
continues to experience higher than average unemployment, but at a rate far 
lower than the younger cohort, indeed beginning to approach the rates of the 
working population in general.  This reflects not just greater personal stability and 
increasing assumption of financial burden, but also the fact that this segment 
also includes recent college graduates, and a higher proportion of high school 
graduates than the one below it. 
 
The second pattern—again, hardly novel—is that unemployment affects different 
racial groups differently.  Indeed, the pattern in the October figures shown above 
can be found at any point in time over the past 30 years.  White unemployment 
rates are lowest, Black rates are highest, and Hispanic rates fall somewhere in 
between, usually toward the low side. 
 
These numbers suggest the existence of serious and chronic problems for 
particular segments of the youth population.  The unemployment rate for younger 
(16-19 year old) black youth, at almost 30 percent, does indeed seem to warrant 
the concern of youth advocates.  The concern is further warranted by an 
additional factor.  Unemployment has a spatial as well as an ethnic dimension; 
low-income neighborhoods in many large cities may experience unemployment 
with rates that exceed 40 percent.4 
 
The variable incidence of unemployment is indeed a chronic issue, one, 
however, with multiple dimensions and causes.  Though it routinely figures in 
discussions of the labor force and employment, it oversimplifies the matter to 
categorize it as fundamentally an employment problem. Joblessness may, in 
many cases, be related to other, more intractable problems:  poverty, immigrant 
status, poor education, geographic accessibility of jobs, etc. 
 
In fact, simply from the standpoint of numbers, unemployment occurs 
overwhelmingly among the majority White population in the United States.  Some 
2.2 million 18-24 year-olds were unemployed in October.  Of those, more than 
1.7 million were White, the remainder Black and Hispanic.5   
 
There is also evidence that unemployment is related to school status.  Somewhat 
surprisingly, 18-24 year-old youth who are enrolled in school experience lower 
rates of unemployment than those not in school.  This pattern, shown in Table 3, 
holds true for all races, as well as sub-groups within the youth population. 
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Table 3:  Unemployment Rates for 18-24 year olds, by race and school 
status, October 2000 
 
  Numbers (000s) Unemployment Rates 
(%) 
 Age 
Group 
 
 
Labor Force
No. 
Unemployed
In-
School
Out of 
School 
Combined 
Rate 
16-24 20,248 2,240 9.6 11.8 11.1
16-19 7,745 1,283 12.6 23.8 16.6
Total 
20-24 14,502 1,257 6.1 9.6 8.7
16-24 18,453 1,710 8.2 10.0 9.3
16-19 6,537 819 10.7 16.0 12.5
White 
20-24 11,856 872 5.2 8.2 7.4
16-24 2,614 597 19.8 24.6 22.8
16-19 898 266 25.1 36.3 29.6
Black 
20-24 1,937 331 12.6 18.5 17.1
16-24 3,433 423 12.3 10.8 12.3
16-19 1,165 225 17.2 18.2 19.3
Hispanic 
20-24 2,068 198 5.6 9.3 9.6
Source: Bureau of Labor Statistics, Employment and Earnings 
 
What may seem natural, at first thought, is the presumption that young people 
enrolled in school would find it harder to find and hold jobs because of their 
school-related responsibilities.  The opposite, however, seems true, and 
resonates with other findings (discussed below) suggesting that school 
attachment is a vital factor in both the short- and long-term success young 
people achieve in the workplace. 
 
A final measure of labor force activity—which some experts find as revealing as 
unemployment—is the number of young people who are inactive, i.e. those who 
are unemployed, not participating in the labor force, and also not participating in 
school.  These figures, for various racial and age segments, are displayed in 
Table 4. 
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 Table 4. Youth who neither are working nor in school, 
numbers and inactivity rates, October 1995 and 20006 
 
 
October, 2000 October, 1995  
 
AGE 
Number 
(000s) 
Percent 
of Labor 
Force 
Number 
(000s) 
Percent 
of Labor 
Force 
16-24 4,031 11.7 4,524 14.1 
16-19 1,344 8.4 1,424 9.7 
 
Total 
20-24 2,689 14.5 3,100 17.5 
      
16-24 2,841 10.3 3,210 12.5 
16-19 900 7.1 1,002 8.7 
 
White 
20-24 1,941 13.1 2,205 15.6 
      
16-24 1,027 19.8 1,063 22.0 
16-19 393 16.0 334 14.5 
Black 
20-24 633 23.3 729 28.8 
      
16-24 888 17.0 1,040 23.2 
16-19 298 12.7 242 13.5 
 
Hispanic 
20-24 590 20.5 698 27.0 
Source: Bureau of Labor Statistics, Employment and Earnings, 
author’s tabulations 
 
One point to note is that both the inactivity rate and the absolute numbers of 
inactive youth are lower now than five years ago.  Indeed, for the 16-24 year-old 
cohort, the absolute numbers and the inactivity rates have both fallen steadily 
since 1980.  The decline shown in Table 4 suggests that, to some degree, the 
economic boom of the past decade did benefit young people, though it is unclear 
how long those benefits will persist if a long-term downturn were to occur. 
 
However, the numbers in Table 4 also reflect the pattern seen earlier:  the rates 
are most favorable for Whites, least so for Blacks and Hispanics.  Of particular 
concern are the strikingly high inactivity rates for non-White youth:  almost one in 
four was inactive, even in the strong economic climate of 2000, suggesting that 
these young people failed to experience significant benefit from the robust 
economy of the 1990s. And it should be noted that almost one in ten 16-19 year-
olds nationally were inactive—a disquieting fraction among a segment that, for 
the most part, would be expected to be in school. 
 
Common sense suggests that the 16-24 age range is one in which, at any given 
point, many young people might register as “idle,” as they make transitions into 
and out of school, into and out of the labor market, often with support from 
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families and friends, that seldom have long-term consequences.  Put another 
way, there is an inherent “frictional” dynamic—not necessarily bad in itself—that  
needs to be understood and recognized in a balanced perspective about youth 
employment issues. 
 
Putting it this way is not meant to trivialize the plight of many young people who 
do fall into that category, who are disproportionately represented because of 
race, may have been there involuntarily for many months, and who in some 
cases may indeed have drifted into routines of crime and substance abuse.  That 
segment of the population does seem to call for policies and programs to 
diminish their numbers, or provide alternatives to idleness. 
 
The larger point to stress, though, is that the youth population’s connection to the 
labor market is fairly dynamic.  We need far richer information, and the capacity 
for more refined interpretations than we now routinely get in order to get a 
precise handle on the reasons, extent, duration and depth of youth connections 
to and disconnections from the labor market. 
 
 3. School Attachment and Completion.  Research has consistently shown 
the decisive importance of both school attachment and school completion in the 
employment prospects of young people.  A complete review of that work is 
beyond the scope of this paper, yet several summary findings make a persuasive 
case: 
 
• There are consistent and lasting “returns to education” in the form of 
higher wages and more sustained employment.  Over both the short and 
the long term, school dropouts earn significantly less than high school 
completers, who in turn earn less than those completing post-secondary 
education. 
 
• Completion of a bachelor’s degree reduces (though it does not eliminate) 
wage disparities experienced by Black and Hispanic workers. 
 
• Attachment to school among 18-24 year olds is associated with higher 
rather than lower rates of employment. 
 
• Education begets further training:  employer-sponsored education 
training—key to success in a rapidly changing economy—goes 
disproportionately to those with more education, rather than less. 
 
The centrality of education, therefore, makes it an essential dimension of the 
youth employment situation. 
 
The rates of school leaving nationally have been falling slowly though not steadily 
over the past two decades.  Concern about these rates, it should be noted, is by 
historical standards comparatively recent.  Through the 30s and 40s completion 
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of eighth grade was considered adequate for boys.  It was in the 60s that high 
school completion became a fairly standard expectation, and in the 70s when the 
realization crystallized that the expectation was not always being met. 
 
There are two numerical dimensions to the issue.  First—the dynamic question—
how many young people move out each year, at what rate, and what is the rate 
of return?  Second, how large is the pool of school leavers—particularly those 
without a diploma—at any time? 
 
The first issue is addressed by what are called “event” dropout rates, the 
percentage of 15-24 year olds enrolled in grades nine or higher in October of one 
year who are no longer enrolled the next.  Table 5 shows selected rates, along 
with the numbers involved, for selected subgroups in October 2000. 
 
Table 5. Event Dropout Rates and Numbers of Youth, October 2000 
 
Subgroup Dropout Rate (%) Number (000s) 
Total 4.8 488 
Male 5.5 280 
Female 4.1 208 
 Non Hispanic 4.1 276 
Black, Non-Hispanic 6.1 91 
Hispanic 7.4 100 
Asian/Pacific Islander 3.5 13 
Low Income Family 10.0 141 
High Income Family 1.6 48 
Aged15-16 2.9 84 
Aged 20-24 16.1 49 
Source: National Center for Education Statistics, Dropout Rates in the United States: 
2000 
 
By October 2000, about 488,000 young people enrolled in high school the 
previous year had left.  Over the past decade, the number ranged between 
347,000 and 588,000.  The overall rate, down from 6.0 percent since 1980, has 
hovered during the past decade between 4.5 and 5.0 percent.  It is unclear 
whether this should be regarded as a steady-state level, whether further declines 
will occur (particularly as the importance of a high-school diploma becomes more 
widely recognized) or whether the rate will increase, as widespread institution of 
standardized testing encourages poor-performing students to leave. 
 
Consistent with earlier data for labor force activity, these rates show variation by 
race.  In the case of dropout behavior, it is Hispanics, and not Blacks, whose rate 
is most unfavorable (accounted for, in part, by high school leaving among 
immigrants).  As the absolute numbers of Hispanics in the U.S. increases over 
the next two decades, the numbers of young Hispanics out of school will grow 
dramatically. 
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Two other points should be noted.  One is that, while the rate for 15- and 16-
year-olds is comparatively low, the numbers are considerable.  In fact, one in six 
dropouts, the table shows, are in this youngest group.  The second point, clearly 
reflected in the table, is that family income significantly affects the decision to 
drop out. 
 
Event dropout rates in a sense reflect the “flow” of young people out of school. 
There they join others like them—a “stock” of young people currently unattached 
to school and without diplomas. The magnitude of this stock is reflected in a 
second statistic, the “status dropout rate,” which measures the fraction of all 16-
24 year olds (working or not) who are out of school who lack a high school 
diploma.  The pattern here is consistent with that found for “event” rates.  The 
figures for October 2000 are shown in Table 6. 
 
Table 6  Status Dropout Rates, October 2000 
 
Subgroup Rate (%) Number (000s) 
Total 10.9 3,776 
Male 12.0 2,082 
Female 9.9 1,694 
White (non 
Hispanic) 
6.9 1,564 
Black (non-
Hispanic) 
13.1 663 
Hispanic 27.8 1,456 
16 Year Olds 3.9 153 
20-24 Year Olds 12.4 2,304 
Source: National Center for Education Statistics, Dropout 
Rates in the United States: 2000 
 
 
Though there have been small declines over the past two decades, the rates 
have been relatively constant over the past decade.  About 11 percent of the 16-
24 year old population annually has held this status—generally more than 3 
million youngsters. 
 
Examining this table in light of the one preceding permits several useful 
inferences.  First, it indicates that older youth dominate this status cohort.  Some 
2.3 million 20-24 year olds in the subject month were out of school without a 
diploma, more than 60 percent of the total.  Disproportionately, the numbers 
suggest, this segment is also likely to be male and Hispanic.  16 Year olds 
constitute only 4 percent of the total (and together with 17 year olds, only 12 
percent). 
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What this suggests, though, is a kind of “core”:  an older population of 20-24 year 
olds, with (as Table 5 suggests) a high propensity to leave school if they are 
attending, and who lack a high school diploma.  Some of these young people 
may be working, to be sure, but lacking the fundamental credential, their longer-
term prospects in the labor market are, other evidence suggests, unpromising. 
 
Hence an issue of importance is this: offsetting the “flow” of youngsters out of 
school, how many who have dropped out of school re-enter?  The answer to this 
question is less straightforward than for the previous ones, and draws on 
information of three kinds. 
 
First, what are the patterns of subsequent attainment of those who drop out?  
Longitudinal survey information provides the best answer. The National 
Educational Longitudinal Survey (NELS) of 1988 eighth graders indicates that by 
1994, 16 percent of those who dropped out had completed a high school 
diploma, 29 percent had completed a GED, 24 percent were working on a 
diploma or GED, and 32 percent had no credential and were taking no steps to 
obtain one.  Socio-economic status again plays a marked role in the pattern:  
More than three-fourths of high SES dropouts completed high school; only a third 
of those from low SES backgrounds did. 
 
Second, what are the patterns of re-attachment to school?  Available data 
suggest that those who drop out are now more likely to return to school than in 
the past.  A comparison of 1990 and 1980 sophomore cohorts found that, within 
two years of dropping out, 58 percent of the 1990 cohort had returned to school 
within two years, compared to only 34 percent of the 1980 class. 
 
The “bottom-line” statistic is:  how many young people eventually achieve a 
credential?  Completion rates, showing the percentage of all 18-24 year olds with 
either a diploma or GED, are presented for October 2000 in Table 7. The table 
indicates that overall 86.5 percent, or some 21.7 million young people, had at 
least a high school diploma.  Older youth, predictably, have higher completion 
rates.7 
 
Despite the increased importance of the diploma, though, these rates have risen 
only slightly in the past three decades, though the rate for Black youth has shown 
strong increases.  Rates for Hispanics, though they have improved somewhat, 
remain low, a disquieting omen in view of the anticipated growth in the Hispanic 
population during the next two decades. 
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Table 7:  High School Completion Rates, October 2000 
 
Characteristic Completion 
Rate 
Number (000s) 
TOTAL 86.5 21,743 
Male 84.9 10,580 
Female 88.1 11,164 
White (non-
Hispanic) 
91.8 15,145 
Black (non-
Hispanic) 
83.7 2,999 
Hispanic 64.1 2,433 
18-19 84.0 5,645 
20-21 86.4 6,359 
22-24 88.1 9,739 
Source: National Center for Education Statistics, Dropout Rates in the 
United States: 2000 
 
5. Some Conclusions.  Drawing on several of the data presented in the 
preceding section, it is possible to bracket the overall magnitude of the problem.  
There are, to begin with, the 4 million or so 18-24 year-olds who are “inactive,” 
neither working nor in school.8  As suggested earlier, that number, on the face of 
it, is an overestimate of the problem, for it includes many young people who are 
voluntarily or temporarily in a transitional state. 
 
The second criterion that seems useful is to look within that 4 million or so, and 
determine who among them are older and also lack a high-school diploma.  A 
plausible cut-point is the numbers of 20-24 year olds without a diploma—about 
2.3 million.  Published data do not indicate how many of these youth are in 
school, or in an alternative track to completing a GED.  It seems reasonable, 
then, to estimate that there may be two million or so older youth—perhaps 18-
24—who are not working, not in school and without a degree.  Such estimates 
may lack a rigorous justification, to be sure, but two million seems a fair starting-
point for assessing the number of youth who ought to be the hub of policy 
concern. 
 
Laissez-faire reviewers of the data presented in this section might well find cause 
for satisfaction.  Out of 35 million or so 16-24 year olds, more than half were in 
school, well over half (not fully overlapping halves) were working, either full or 
part-time.  Only about 12 percent were inactive, some 4 million or so youth (down 
by almost 500,000 from five years earlier); many of those were inactive only 
briefly and perhaps by choice (whether sound choice or not), while for some 
inactivity would admittedly be sustained, and mean hardship or unproductive 
idleness.  School attachment, whether measured by dropping out, returning to 
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school or graduating, has shown improvement over time, with high school 
graduation rates of Black youth approaching those of Whites. 
 
Other reviewers might perhaps regard the 4 million inactive youth as an 
alarmingly large number, still high despite a decade’s prosperity.  They might 
also find disquieting the 2.3 million 20-24 year olds without a diploma or 
credential.  Assuredly, there would be concern at the strikingly high 
unemployment rates among Black (especially) and Hispanic youth, and at the 
strikingly low number of Hispanics who complete high school. 
 
All these points, with their potentially contradictory interpretations, should figure 
in any informed discussion about policy regarding youth employment.  Rather 
than taking one side or another, we prefer to present four broader, and we 
believe less controversial, observations. 
 
First, the numbers above, taken in totality, suggest a dynamic process:  a volatile 
age segment who are working, entering and leaving the labor market, entering, 
leaving and sometimes re-entering school settings, taking time off, as well as 
being in some cases left with inactivity as an unwelcome last resort.  Without 
hazarding an opinion about how many such youth is right or justifiable, we think it 
important to stress that the existence of this “stock” of young people (which, 
encouragingly, has been gradually shrinking over two decades) is itself a kind of 
norm. 
 
Rather than decrying (or defending) its magnitude, we should first concede that, 
in a laissez-faire economic (and social) system, there will always be a pool of 
inactive young people.  Whether its present size is defensible from a national 
perspective, and what a tolerable scale of inactivity is, are questions beyond the 
scope of this paper. 
 
Second, unemployment rates, though they measure an important dimension of 
youth activity with respect to the labor market, have limited value in assessing 
the youth employment problem.  Overall, they indicate what common sense 
might predict:  young people can expect to have a harder time in the labor market 
where they often are competing with more experienced, motivated and skilled 
adults.  The numbers do not reveal much about the dynamics of youth entry and 
departure from school and the labor market, nor about the seriousness or 
intensity of their participation in the labor market. 
 
What seems more useful as a policy measure is the inactivity rate, which 
provides a snapshot of the size, at least, of a critical segment of the youth 
population:  those who are unattached to any critical work-related institution.  
This measure, used to provide a context for employment, unemployment and 
education status, seems to tap a more fundamental and important issue in 
understanding issues of youth employment. 
 
 Taking Stock  Page 15 
Third, we lack critical information regarding this dynamic segment of the youth 
population.  We are not routinely able to “age” this group, i.e. to determine what 
percentage has been inactive for just one or two months; or for longer (say, three 
to six months—a plausible indicator of serious detachment from the key 
institutions of school and the workplace).  Nor can we routinely cross-tabulate 
other critical information—how many completed schooling within three months of 
leaving school, have been unemployed for more than six months, have been out 
of school for two years, etc.  With such data, it would be possible to establish 
with greater precision the magnitude of the core population within the inactivity 
cohort who are most seriously at risk of failing to make a useful connection to the 
labor market. 
 
The fourth point is that poor school attachment, as measured either by dropout 
rates or school completion rates, is a major contributor to the levels of inactivity 
among youth in the U.S.  The conclusion, indeed, seems inescapable that much 
of the “high-risk” core among inactive youth are to be found among those lacking 
a diploma, and particularly among those 2 million plus 20-24 year olds without 
one. 
 
Though the overall reasons for this are as complex and vexing as public 
education itself, one reality deserves to be stressed policy:  national policy 
(especially education policy) has generally failed to acknowledge responsibility 
for the continuing presence of school-age young people who have left school 
without finishing and failed to find a suitable alternative.  Consistently, the stance 
has been that such youngsters are temporarily absent or misguided, or a 
negligible issue.  The learning opportunities available to them outside the school 
building have generally been haphazard and deficient in quality—part of the 
“second-chance” network to be described in the following section of the paper. 
 
3. The Youth Second-Chance Network:  A Summary of Policy and 
Programming 
 
Most policy and programming expressly designed to promote the employment of 
youth has come from the U.S. Department of Labor.  Far less prominent a 
participant has been the U.S. Department of Education.  In this section we 
summarize first the key policy (i.e. legislative) measures that form the history of 
the second-chance field.  That is followed by a discussion of the programming 
history and environment, with special attention on three issues:  the evolution of 
the second-chance field; alternative education; and the phenomenon of youth 
development. 
 
1. Employment Policy. The evolution of policy and programs to meet the 
special employment needs of youth has been both wayward and fitful.  There 
never has been a broad, sustained belief that such programs were essential; and 
little agreement on what policies and programs made sense.  Entering the 21st 
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century, we can look back to some lessons and learning, but not much 
coherence in goals, strategies or activities. 
 
The policy history begins, in fact, not with youth but with adults; and not with the 
urban, minority jobless but instead with White rural coalminers whose jobs were 
vanishing as technology reduced the need for their labor.  The Manpower 
Development and Training Act (MDTA) of 1962 was the first federal legislation to 
support job retraining for what, in current parlance, would be termed “displaced 
workers.” 
 
Within two years MDTA would assume much more of an anti-poverty slant, as 
the War on Poverty extended the reach of federal policy to include cities, and 
also to include “disadvantaged” populations:  poor adults—and youth—whose 
lack of incomes, limited access to suburban job growth and impoverished 
communities hindered or prevented their access to jobs and economic security.  
In this early targeting of poor populations, youth were programmatically treated 
no differently than adults. 
 
The Job Corps, established in 1965, was the first comprehensive response to the 
needs of long-term jobless youth.  It featured both duration and intensity, as well 
as a recognition that the environmental conditions in which poor youngsters lived 
could themselves be a detriment to their success.  Significantly, Job Corps 
placed a heavy emphasis on schooling, a characteristic it has retained 
throughout its 35 year history. 
 
The Neighborhood Youth Corps9, by contrast, was as much a kind of social 
insurance—against youthful idleness, some of whose consequences seemed to 
be reflected in the civil disturbances that occurred in American cities in the 60s—
as it was a coherent youth program.  It grew into the summer jobs program, 
targeting low-income young people, which until 1998 (when it ceased to be a 
separately funded activity) was the largest youth program in the U.S. 
 
The successor to these programs—the Comprehensive Employment and 
Training Act (CETA)—became the vehicle for a significant, though short-lived, 
expansion of federal youth programming.  This is ironic, because a central goal 
of CETA (passed during the Nixon Administration) was to reduce the federal 
presence, limit the proliferation of special-purpose programs, and devolve 
responsibility to states and localities for employment efforts for adults and youth. 
 
The effect of the baby boom’s entry into the labor market—a significant spike in 
the unemployment rate for young people--coupled with the more activist bent of 
the Carter Administration led to a significant national-level youth initiative.  The 
Youth Employment Demonstration Projects Act (1977) was designed as a $1 
billion initiative to combat the high rates of unemployment then being 
experienced as the post-war generation reached working age, and also to study 
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the causes of youth unemployment and the programmatic means of addressing 
it. 
 
On both counts its success was modest.  Though the “field” of youth employment 
attained, for the first and only time, an adequate and sizable organizational 
framework, political pressures to spend money quickly and to serve as many 
youth as possible thwarted establishment of a coherent, lasting, professionalized 
cadre of institutions.  Most programs funded under the initiative were fairly 
traditional in nature; much of the research was either superficially designed or 
weakly implemented.  And the pressure to spend and serve led to predictable 
excesses and miscues.  The Reagan Administration, in 1981, ended almost all of 
YEDPA, and terminated most of the research activities before they could be 
completed. 
 
The Job Training Partnership Act, CETA’s successor, again sought to minimize 
the federal role, while significantly expanding that of the private sector.  It 
represented a much-scaled-back level of programming, though with increased 
recognition of the distinctive needs of youth, which were reflected in a focus on 
“youth employment competencies,” a series of workplace-oriented skills that 
included basic (i.e. reading and math) skills. 
 
JTPA was in most respects, though, status-quo legislation.  Its main policy 
tenet—that the private sector ought to have a significant role in local decisions—
proved difficult to implement fully in practice, and did not in fact yield results 
decisively different or better than the predominantly public-sector decision-
making that had gone before it. 
 
The services it supported remained very much the traditional mix (minus publicly 
funded work experience, which until the late 90s became a nearly forgotten 
employment policy).  For young people, the services were of three basic kinds.  
“Pre-employment” services, the staple among the three, combine some 
workplace orientation, job-finding skills, remedial education and job development.  
This package of services, aimed at immediate placement in the labor market, is 
brief, usually lasting no more than three months. 
 
Classroom skills training, generally reserved for older youth (and in particular 
those with better educational skills), involved formal training for a specific, usually 
knowledge-intensive, occupation.  On-the-job training programs (using federal or 
local funds to underwrite salary or training costs) which placed young people 
directly in private sector job settings, were sparingly used for young people. 
 
Research findings on the long-term impacts of these programs have never been 
strong or persuasive.  The Job Corps alone has compiled a consistently solid 
record of positive, sustained benefit.  For the most part, research on other 
programs has shown short-term boosts in employment and earnings, which 
decay within 18 months. 
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The lackluster results of a national evaluation completed in 1991 damaged 
JTPA’s credibility, and produced serious doubts about the effectiveness of the 
youth programs JTPA supported.  The study found only modest effectiveness for 
the private-sector-led adult program, and no positive impacts on youth at all. 
 
The current legislation (the Workforce Investment Act) reflects the fallout from 
that study, and the unimpressive record that preceded it.  It is more modest in 
scale than its predecessor.  Besides the Job Corps (which, alone among 
federally funded youth employment programs has grown over the past decade), it 
limits funding for youth initiatives, in particular eliminating the separate earmark 
for summer youth employment. 
 
In contrast to the funding reduction, the legislation goes further than previous 
laws in recognizing the special needs of youth, and widening the range of 
supportive activities eligible for funding.  It also incorporates a geographically 
focused component (the Youth Opportunity Program) intended to concentrate 
employment-related services in a number of demonstration communities 
throughout the U.S. 
 
Administration and Congressional support for all of these youth programs, 
excepting Job Corps, is shallow.  In a recessionary economy, the major 
legislative priorities are likely be jobless adults; the employment needs of youth 
will likely take a back seat. 
 
2. Education Policy. Education is the most far-reaching and widely 
recognized policy governing the lives of youth in the U.S.  It is far-reaching for the 
obvious reason:  it requires transmission of a body of learning that (with 
considerable local debate and variation) society judges socially desirable and 
essential to the workplace.  Just as important, perhaps, participating in public 
education is meant to govern the time and activities of young people, especially 
teenagers.  Until age 18 or so, they are expected to be in school.  Leaving is (up 
to a certain age) illegal; and it is strongly discouraged before graduation. 
 
National education policy has, at least until the mid-90s, been concerned almost 
exclusively with what happens inside school buildings.  As noted earlier, the 
phenomenon of school leaving, and the education needs of youth who departed 
formal schooling and failed to return, was treated largely as a measure of 
institutional inefficiency.  The dropout rates were computed, and their existence 
decried.  But at a national level, the responsibility to educate, and the focus on 
means and outcomes, traditionally has stopped just inside the school door. 
 
The federal government has provided support for education for those out of 
school, mostly in the form of “adult basic education” and a scattering of other 
programs.  The major credential for out-of-school learners who do not return to 
school is the General Equivalency Diploma (GED), a testing credential that, like 
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the SAT, is actually owned, designed, scored and standardized by a non-profit 
entity (the American Council on Education).10 
 
One major departure from this stance came in the “school-to-work” movement, 
culminating in passage of the School to Work Opportunities Act (1989).  Its core 
purpose was to strengthen the connection between schooling and the workplace, 
emulating the established approach used in European countries (the German 
apprenticeship model in particular).  Administratively, it featured a formal 
partnership between the Departments of Labor (with responsibility for training, 
employment and workplace programs) and the Department of Education. 
 
Results were mixed and modest, for three reasons.  First, its programmatic 
initiatives necessarily had to rely on local school districts, which, with limited 
exceptions, relied on traditional structures (i.e. the vocational education system), 
or otherwise proved unable to establish the strong connections to the business 
community on which success would depend.  Second, the legislation and its 
programs were too often viewed as levers for broader school reform. By opening 
the schoolroom doors to private sector scrutiny, advocates believed, change and 
improvement would come about. In fact, with comparatively modest funding and 
a relatively short life (the legislation was “sunset” in 2001), the new program had 
little chance even to achieve its narrow stated aims. 
 
Finally, the program failed to generate strategies to reach and assist those 
students who were already doing poorly in school.  To satisfy the private sector’s 
justifiable desire to employ the best workers available, many school-to-work 
programs favored better-performing over worse-performing students.11  And 
school-to-work initiatives, since they were operated in school buildings, provided 
no direct assistance at all to young people who had dropped out. 
 
 3. The second-chance network. Since the passage of CETA, in 1973, local 
governments have had the primary responsibility for planning and spending 
funds for employment programs both for adults and young people.  The network 
of service providers varied from city to city.  Typically, however, it included 
community-based organizations (some, like Opportunities Industrialization 
Centers or the Urban League, affiliates of their own national network), community 
colleges, chambers of commerce, for-profit and non-profit training 
organizations.12 
 
Summer youth employment programs are similarly decentralized in operation:  
local non-profits and public agencies contract with the central job training agency 
to employ small numbers of youth for specific purposes. Though a handful of 
youth-focused national affiliate organizations do exist (Jobs for Youth, WAVE) 
which have installed local programs in selected cities, generally focused on rapid 
job attainment, the second-chance program network is overwhelmingly local in 
nature. 
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Over the past two decades funding for these programs, and for the networks that 
provide them, has been on the wane.  There are no nationally recognized 
professional standards for “youth workers,” though efforts to create them are 
underway; staff salaries remain low (and turnover consequently high), and in 
most communities the network of service providers has little coherence or 
visibility. 
 
One legacy of the Job Training Partnership Act has been an emphasis on 
performance standards that typically (if sometimes obliquely) emphasize “least-
cost” principles.  As a consequence, much youth employment programming has 
concentrated on short-term employment readiness and rapid placement in jobs, 
usually at entry level.  Only with the passage of the recent Workforce Investment 
Act (WIA) has that emphasis been changed, to a push for more “year-round” 
services.  In some localities, however, it has been difficult to find service 
providers willing enough or creative enough to provide such sustained and 
intensive regimens. 
 
While the great bulk of programming is modest in quality, individual examples of 
meritorious and promising programs do exist.  The National Youth Employment 
Coalition, in cooperation with the U.S. Department of Labor, has sponsored a 
quality recognition program to identify youth programs that meet plausible 
standards for operational quality.  About 75 such programs, nationwide, have 
been cited in five years. 
 
Perhaps because it has been consistently underfunded, with consequently short 
time horizons, the field as a whole has had a quite limited strategic perspective.  
Its rhetoric has focused on “solving” the youth employment problem (an unlikely 
and perhaps unworkable outcome, as the analysis in the preceding section of 
this paper suggests).  The second-chance field, with few standards for quality or 
performance, and little professionalization, remains a small and marginal 
network. 
 
 4. Alternative Education.  Common to almost all the programs in the 
second-chance field has been recognition that their young clients need 
educational help.  Since MDTA (the first Labor Department program to address 
youth unemployment), job training legislation has formally required educational 
assistance and instruction as part of youth programming. 
 
This posed a considerable challenge.  Many of the young people who found their 
way to these programs had already left school, and arrived with little appetite for 
resuming their education.  Many had been left back, and may have been out of 
school for a year or more.  Thus their educational levels were diverse, their 
instructional needs extensive and idiosyncratic. 
 
The responsibility to meet this challenge fell to a second-chance field whose 
capacity was historically limited.  Responses of four kinds typically resulted: 
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• Ad hoc instructional programs, often developed with minimal professional 
guidance, and often staffed by uncertified staff; 
 
• Reliance on literacy, adult basic education13 or GED programs, often 
conducted by community colleges or local night schools; 
 
• The creation of “alternative schools,” limited in number and usually 
unaffiliated with public education, which sought to provide instruction with 
greater consistency and sophistication than the ad hoc programs. 
 
• De novo instructional packages developed and marketed nationally, many 
involving the use of computers, or computer assisted instructional 
systems. 
 
Thus what is currently referred to as “alternative education” is in fact an uneven 
collection of programs and program pieces, of varied design, even more varied 
quality, and generally limited effectiveness.  The yield from this effort has been 
unimpressive.  Most youth employment practitioners concede that, in a weak 
field, education is by far the weakest link. 
 
What has contributed heavily to this failure is the tepid interest taken in the 
problem by public education.  Both in its legislative framework and in its practice, 
public education gave only the most limited attention to the phenomenon of 
unschooled youth.  The need is considerable, yet public education at most levels  
and in most communities has permitted the second-chance field to go it alone. 
 
That indifference left a weak network, largely unguided, to respond to the 
educational needs of some of the most difficult and challenging young students—
who, critics would argue, public education itself had failed to serve.  Not 
surprisingly, the results have been unimpressive.  And lacking coherent support, 
alternative education over the past twenty years has evolved little as an 
enterprise, and only sporadically produced strong results. 
 
Three factors suggest some encouraging change to this state of affairs.  
Practitioners in the field have, with foundation support, undertaken an effort (still 
largely informal) to bring some coherence and quality standards to their work.  
The nexus of this effort, a working committee called the Austin Group, is 
developing a set of program assessment standards, governing management, 
staffing and curriculum, to be promulgated among a wider group of practitioners.  
At the same time, they are also beginning to develop a database of effective 
curricula to serve as a resource for other practitioners in the field. 
 
Second, the U.S. Department of Education’s involvement has widened, slightly.  
Its Community Learning Centers initiative (now involving more than 6000 schools 
across the U.S.) focuses on after-school programming for young people, as well 
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as continuing education for adults.  That focus has created increased need for 
curriculum and instructional support for students (both youth and adults) that 
have non-traditional learning needs. 
 
Finally, the slow growth of charter schools—which are a prominent feature of the 
new education legislation—holds promise as a strategy for strengthening 
instruction and learning for youth who have left school.  In particular, a small 
number of more sophisticated youth programs (discussed in the following section 
of the paper) have established charter schools expressly to serve the out-of-
school youth who are their main clients. 
 
Charter schools are likely to benefit under the current federal administration.  
Their spread may provide the beginnings of an institutional network that has 
legitimate standing in the public education world, and that has the capacity to 
serve the educational needs of uncredentialed, out of school youth far better than 
the current cluster of second-chance educational programs. 
 
 5. The Youth Development Movement.  As noted earlier, the original 
blueprints for youth employment initiatives were programs for adults.  For much 
of the past 35 years, employment programs routinely enrolled both adults and 
youth together, and in practice did not differentiate among them.  “Youth-only” 
programs (not counting the Job Corps and the Summer Youth Employment 
Program) evolved slowly within a program framework built around the needs of 
jobless adults. 
 
The past decade has produced a useful corrective movement.  Through the work 
of a number of advocacy organizations, the importance of recognizing and 
accommodating the dynamics of adolescent growth and development has 
become widely recognized by practitioners in the field. 
 
On the face of it, this may sound like a belated grasp of the obvious.  The fact is, 
however, that the second-chance youth network remains fairly unsophisticated 
and unprofessionalized. As noted previously, low salaries and unstable funding 
have limited the appeal of “youth-work” as a profession.  Hiring standards remain 
haphazard, and only casual attention is paid to what qualifications might be 
useful for working with young people. 
 
The youth development movement in great part, then, was a measure of the 
field’s limited sophistication.  Its concrete value has been two-fold.  First, it has 
helped to crystallize, on a broad level, agreement about effective principles for 
creating program environments that will attract, engage and hold young people, 
and that will help to identify goals and activities that are developmentally 
appropriate for them. 
 
Second, it has established a partial basis for hiring, training and professionalizing 
staff.  Formal training curricula, such as that developed by the Center for Youth 
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Development, have been adopted (though not yet widely) by a variety of youth 
organizations for use with existing and new staff. 
 
A larger benefit is that “youth development” offers a broad organizing principle for 
rethinking policy regarding youth.  Several large cities, for instance, have 
established youth development centers as vehicles for rationalizing programs 
and funding that, from a variety of different sources, is all intended to serve 
youth.  The Workforce Investment Act, discussed earlier, actually incorporates 
“youth development” into legislative language; its program regulations expressly 
promote mentoring and other developmentally rooted activities. 
 
The potential for this kind of policy thinking, however, seems limited.  Youth 
development advocates argue that the U.S. needs to fundamentally rethink—and 
significantly expand—the support and resources it affords youth.  They envision 
a rich network of institutions and programs that would promote the growth and 
development of youth at every stage.  In effect, this would make youth 
development not a guide to practice, but a policy in and of itself. 
 
That is unlikely to occur.  Limited rather than expansive policies are the norm in 
the U.S.  It is hard to find strong sentiment that the nation is failing its teenagers 
on a broad scale, and there consequently is no real impetus to widen the policy 
reach. 
 
In addition, this broad thinking deflects attention from the very real weaknesses 
and limitations in the existing second-chance network.  Youth development 
continues to serve as a corrective and enrichment for a set of programs badly in 
need of professional and practice standards.  Until the current network achieves 
a semblance of credibility and effectiveness, it seems premature to argue for 
extending the field even further. 
 
4. The rationale for policy 
 
Thirty plus years of public expenditure and effort have produced, in the end, a 
fragile and haphazard skeleton of youth programs and initiatives.  Its strongest 
feature is the Job Corps, outside of which the remaining pieces are unsystematic 
and weak.  The youth employment “problem” they are arrayed to meet has been 
only marginally affected by the existence of this network. 
 
It might seem reasonable, in light of the limited success of the second-chance 
employment programs over the last two to three decades, to argue that nothing 
should be done—that a policy which has produced such modest results ought not 
to be continued. 
 
It seems probable, however, that employment programs for young people will 
continue to be part of the policy landscape.  Work and employment, after all, 
remain defining qualities in society.  The inactivity of a significant number of 
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young people, and within that group a core number who face considerable 
barriers in becoming productive workers, will continue to produce investments in 
some version of a second-chance network.  Even in light of the historic 
parsimony of U.S. social policy, it seems inevitable that such programs will 
continue to be supported. 
 
It also seems likely that funding for out-of-school youth will continue to lack much 
of an advocacy base. That makes it extremely unlikely that significant expansion 
of this kind of programming will occur, either in terms of the resources provided 
or the scope of intervention that is permitted. The policy balance, we would 
argue, will reflect constrained support for these programs, and continuing 
pressure for them to justify themselves. 
 
The pivotal question, then, is this: what kinds of investments in this field will 
return the greatest yield.  A critical part of the question is this basic fact:  the 
nation will routinely have to deal with a significant number of young people who 
fail to complete their education, are not in school, and face dismal prospects in 
the labor market.  Rather than view this segment of the population as a 
temporary aberration, or a negligible segment that will naturally sort out its own 
needs and problems, it seems more reasonable to accept them as a continuing 
reality. 
 
Public secondary education now loses about five percent of its upper-grade 
students annually.  Presumably that percentage could be lowered somewhat 
(and, as argued below, lowering it should be an important policy priority).  How 
much is debatable. The possibility of reducing it to near zero, however, seems 
remote. 
 
Some fraction of young people, whether for reasons justifiable or not, are apt to 
leave school, and some fraction of them in turn will not return—or will do so 
slowly.  That should be a normal expectation.  And as such, it should prompt a 
set of policies that both seek to minimize the number of leavers and to assure 
that, for those who do leave, institutions and pathways exist to keep credible and 
legitimate schooling options within their reach. 
 
Such options will require far richer and more current data about the youth 
themselves.  Either more extensive survey data collection, or more frequent and 
detailed special studies than currently are done are needed.  One approach that 
should be explored is to better integrate data now collected separately by the 
Census Bureau (the CPS) and the Department of Education (holder of by far the 
largest repository of school- and youth-related data).  Better information would 
permit far more precise identification of core groups most at risk of labor market 
failure, as well as clearer understanding of the dynamics of youths’ movement 
into and out of both school and the labor market. 
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It also seems appropriate to center policy thinking on a fundamental, critical goal:  
to reduce the size of the “inactivity” rate in the youth population. As has been 
argued, it is neither feasible nor particularly desirable to eliminate youth inactivity.  
A society disinclined to push for socially obtrusive policies must implicitly 
countenance certain kinds, or particular phases, of inactivity among young 
people. 
 
Clearly some manifestations or levels of inactivity are undesirable, and it is 
clearly useful to shrink some segments of the inactive youth population.  For 
instance, there is little to object to in seeking to reduce the number of 20-year 
olds without diplomas who are not working, or the number of 18-year olds with 
high school degrees who are not in school and have not worked for more than six 
months. 
 
Over time, understanding of and balanced policy attention to rationalizing 
inactivity rates among youth appear to offer a far more cogent perspective than 
the fairly narrow focus on employment/unemployment that has driven much 
policy over the past three decades.  Using inactivity as a broad calculus also 
creates a mode of policy thinking that spans (and hopefully can help to bring 
together) both education and the existing second-chance youth network. 
 
5. Recommendations 
 
A. Increasing School Attachment 
 
Our first recommendation is to substantially intensify efforts to reduce the number 
of youth who leave school.  Disproportionately, those young people contribute to 
the most worrisome segments of the inactive youth population.  Simply keeping 
more youth connected to education would go a long way toward reducing 
undesirable levels of inactivity. 
 
The most obvious way to achieve this is to keep more youngsters in school. This 
means continued improvements within public education that make schooling 
more attractive and relevant to more and more youth, and thus increase their 
motivation to remain and finish. 
 
While much of the improvement necessarily focuses on teaching, curriculum, 
instruction and school organization, it seems important also for the school-career 
connection to be more energetically emphasized.  Our recommendation is that 
the private sector be recruited to assist in this effort. 
 
There are two specific initiatives worth considering.  One is to develop stronger 
career guidance and exposure programs targeting middle school students, that 
are supported and/or operated by local businesses.  Research suggests that 
middle school is the stage when young people most need information about the 
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range of career opportunities available to them, and can significantly benefit from 
reinforcement of the link between learning and earning. 
 
A related initiative would target high school students, and would involve 
business-designed and conducted “labor market experience” sessions.  Its goal 
would be to ensure that every student gets an opportunity to learn first-hand how 
business and the job market work; to learn about the expectations (particularly 
educational expectations) of prospective employees; and to explore opportunities 
for blending work and continued education after high school. 
 
The specific elements of such an initiative—employer lectures, work-study, job 
shadows, internships—already are in use, but far from systematically.  A broad-
based demonstration project that incorporated these tools into comprehensive, 
business-led partnerships seems appropriate 
 
Such an initiative would demand changed behavior on the part of both local 
schools and local businesses.  Chambers of commerce, which are both 
ubiquitous and frequently a source of criticism regarding the preparation of high 
school students, might be enlisted as local leadership agencies for such 
partnerships. 
 
B. Creating and strengthening alternatives to formal schooling 
 
Complementary to the goal of keeping youth in school is to prevent their being 
officially detached from credentialed education when they do elect to leave 
traditional education settings.  Explicit support for formal, temporary “school 
leaves” is a partial solution.  However, the decision to leave school is often a 
gradual or unscheduled (and often unrecorded) process, one that may not 
register on school rolls for many months after the departure. 
 
One solution is to create attractive, school-sanctioned alternatives that young 
people, who find themselves temporarily or permanently ill-suited for the normal 
institutional environment of a public school, could select. Charter schools, which 
combine the alternative setting with the legitimacy of public education (i.e. they 
are degree-granting, and the degrees have equal standing with those of regular 
high schools), seem to be a promising institutional approach.  Such schools, if 
they were plentiful enough, and positively sanctioned by public education, would 
keep youth from “leaving school” by extending and varying the institutional 
network that constitutes “schooling”. 
 
These institutional alternatives should also provide “reentry” paths for young 
people who leave school, and later seek ways of returning.  The “twilight school” 
model, essentially a separate instructional setting for older youth seeking to earn 
a degree, represents one such option.  Particularly when integrated with 
“community schools,” twilight programs offer youth without credentials a venue 
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that will permit them to take a diploma that has the formal recognition of the 
public schools. 
 
 
C. Enhancing the Second-Chance System 
 
There is a clear need to create a more focused and effective system of second-
chance programs.  The system proposed here is fairly simple and lean, builds on 
the existing framework, and seeks to achieve three main purposes—all related to 
the theme of minimizing inactivity among youth: 
 
1. To support rapid labor force attachment for young people, with or without 
degrees, who want to work; 
 
2. To provide comprehensive, sustained support and services to young 
people facing substantial barriers to employment (long-term disconnection 
from school, early parenting, extended joblessness, prior criminal 
involvement); 
 
3. To offer a range of connections to educational opportunities, and at all 
times to encourage young people to use them. 
 
These, in essence, are the nominal purposes of the current network of programs.  
It has fallen short in achieving them, in part because the field has always been 
adjunct and marginally funded; in part because it has lacked the educational 
resources it needs to do its job; and in part because the succession of legislation 
that produced and supported it has had shifting and sometimes contradictory 
emphases. 
 
The system envisioned here is deliberatively parsimonious in design.  
Organizations providing two basic service types are proposed.14  The first, 
exemplified in programs such as Jobs for Youth, would offer intensive but short-
term workplace training and job search assistance, followed by quick 
connection to a job.  Its major target group would be younger (16 to 19 year old) 
youth, with or without diplomas or other credentials, who have decided that they 
want to forego schooling and work instead—at least for the short term. 
 
Such programs might require that young people must also go to school in order 
to get help.  Most certainly, they would provide extensive information and 
continuing, intensive encouragement to young people to rejoin school (in some 
setting) or to go on with their education.  However, their main purpose would be 
to ensure a smooth and quick connection to the job market for young people who 
want it. 
 
The second service strategy would target youth whose disconnections from 
school and work are extensive, and would focus on providing structure, 
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sustained involvement, intensive educational or work experience, and 
extensive personal support.  The existing Job Corps programs are a key model 
and an important resource—one that, in addition, has a long and fairly stable 
funding and organizational history.  Expanding upon they national system of Job 
Corps centers (and, possibly, exploring variations in the intensity and range of 
environmental features in these Centers) represents an important and persuasive 
policy step. 
 
Two quite related program models also appear promising.  One is youth service 
corps, of which there are roughly 120 or so nationally.  The majority of these 
programs, that feature stays lasting up to a year, target jobless youth, and offer 
intensive educational services, stipended work experience (much of it in fee-for-
service jobs in local communities) and courses that emphasize personal growth, 
decision-making and later connection to the labor market.  Basic education is 
heavily emphasized; indeed, youth corps have been among a handful of 
programs that have undertaken to start charter schools to meet the educational 
needs of their client youth. 
 
A similar model is YouthBuild, a national program model with affiliates in more 
than 150 localities.  Its philosophy and overall service strategy is similar to that of 
the youth service corps.  Its work focus has usually (though not always) been 
housing.  Like the corps, several of its local affiliates have established their own 
charter schools.  Unlike the corps, YouthBuild gets direct funding from the federal 
government (approximately $65 million in the current year from the Department 
of Housing and Urban Development). 
 
All these latter kinds of programs are expensive to operate (with costs for a full 
year stay exceeding $20,000); at best, only a modest number are likely to be fully 
funded on a regular basis. Demand for available slots will generally exceed the 
number that are available.  Nonetheless, the Service Corps and YouthBuild, 
together with the Job Corps, constitute a viable last-chance venue for youth with 
difficult-to-meet social, educational and employment needs.15 
 
Elements of the two-tiered system envisioned here already exist, of course, in 
many localities.  Historically, though, the distribution of these pieces has been 
uneven and happenstantial, and the quality of offerings has been uneven.  The 
haphazardness has partly contributed to the lackluster overall performance of the 
programs that do exist.  A serious effort to build a system will need to address 
the issues of reliability and results. 
 
To produce quality, consistency and performance will require three distinct steps.  
First, there must be adequate and stable funding.  As suggested above, this does 
not translate into funding that putatively serves all who might need it.  Instead, 
the aim here should be to encourage and support programs that receive 
predictable and consistent funding levels.  Adequate funding should support 
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personnel and administrative expenses that attract and retain qualified, dedicated 
staff.  
 
In addition, there should be a sustained effort to create and disseminate 
professional standards among the programs.  These standards should stipulate 
academic credentials, substantive knowledge and skills, as well as specialized 
training in human services, adolescent development, and organizational 
management. 
 
The philanthropic community, in particular, may be best suited to creating and 
supporting professional development in the field.  It has a record of involvement, 
and could muster the resources necessary to underwrite a five to seven year 
initiative to promote and disseminate professional standards and training. 
 
Finally, this evolving system and its individual organizations must develop and be 
subject to both performance standards and certification.  Our recommendation is 
that, rather than merely relying upon the outcome measures that have 
characterized the field—completions, placements, retentions—new performance 
evaluation should be built around robust assessment and review processes, 
which would feature extensive involvement by the business community.16 
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ENDNOTES 
                                                 
1 About 20 percent of the one million or so federal and state prisoners are aged 18 to 24.  An 
additional 100,000 or so youth under 18 are typically in juvenile custodial facilities. 
 
2 Besides the overlap in the division shown here, it should be noted, these categories are 
themselves not universally used.  Analysis of youth demographics often adopt categories such as 
14-18, 16-21, 15-19, etc.  The lack of comparability makes it difficult to stay consistent in 
discussions of the magnitude of youth needs. 
 
3 For definitional purposes, the “labor force” consists both of those working and those 
unemployed who are actively seeking work.  It excludes those who are incarcerated and in the 
military. 
 
4 Data on the spatial distribution of employment and unemployment are not routinely available, 
and emerge only through decennial censuses and special studies.  For an example of the latter, 
see William Julius Wilson, When Work Disappears. 
 
5 Note that in many government statistics, Hispanics can be either White or Black, so that 
comparing numbers of Hispanics to Whites or Blacks may be misleading. 
 
6 The inactivity rate is the number of young people who are unemployed, not in the labor force 
and not in school divided by the total population of youth in that age segment of the non-
institutional population.  Thus Table 4 indicates that in October 2000, for every 100 youth aged 
16-24, about 12 were neither employed nor in school; in 1995 the number was closer to 14. 
 
7 About 900,000 people take the GED annually, the majority of them under thirty years of age. 
About 55 percent meet the test standards, and receive an equivalency certificate. 
 
8 These numbers, it should be recalled, do not include young people who are incarcerated or 
those in the military. 
 
9 NYC was in fact modeled, in part, on the conservation and service corps that had been 
operated in the depression 30s.  It quickly evolved, though, into a general-purpose work 
experience program, with little service awareness and limited connection to specific 
neighborhoods. 
 
10 The GED is about to undergo a major revision, designed in part to reflect educational standards 
now being widely adopted through the states, some 40 of which have instituted their own systems 
of competency testing. 
 
11 While the program’s aim was to ensure more learning on the part of students, some parents 
were reluctant to have their children participate, viewing school-to-work as a non-college track. 
 
12 Job Corps Centers are operated separately from other employment training programs through 
a national office of the U.S. Department of Labor. 
 
13 About one-third of enrollees in adult basic education programs nationally are under the age of 
24. 
 
14 Not discussed here is direct work experience, which has had a checkered career in the 
employment training realm.  Though evidence regarding its later impact on employment and 
earnings is weak at best, it bears consideration as a means of lowering inactivity levels, 
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especially during periods of high unemployment.  Note that work and community service are 
integral parts of both youth corps and YouthBuild, described below. 
 
15 Job Corps has been the subject of two federal evaluations, both positive.  Youth corps 
programs also have been evaluated, with positive results, but of a more limited nature.  
YouthBuild has not yet been the subject of a comparison group evaluation. 
 
16 The first, to be designed and perhaps carried out by the private sector, would gauge the 
connections and responsiveness of the programs and organizations to the local labor marketTheir 
ability to develop knowledge, relationships, contacts and savvy about their local labor market, to 
stay abreast of skill and educational needs, and to respond effectively to its signals, is of critical 
operational importance.  Independent, business-designed reviews of performance would help 
establish the credibility of the second-chance network with perhaps its most  important client 
base. 
 
The second assessment strategy would be on the order of a peer-review process, such as that 
used in the accreditation of schools and colleges.  An organization under review would conduct a 
self-evaluation, which would then be reviewed by a visiting peer team, composed of senior staff 
from similar organizations.  Rather than focusing solely on specific quantitative measures of 
performance, this review process would examine the organization’s goals, activities and 
effectiveness from a strategic perspective, and assess its results in the context of both its local 
community, and the peer organizations performing similar services. 
